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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to a leading scholar of international commercial law, the
success of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna
tional Sale of Goods 1 has "surpassed aU expectations," and the treaty
"represents the most successful attempt to unify an important part of the
many and various rules of the law of international commerce."z This
" Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1973. Harvard
College: M.A. 1975. Harvard University; J.D. 1981. Harvard Law School. 'This article
is an adaptation of a paper delivered at a conference at Istanbul Bilgi University in
November 2006 entitled "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: What Challenges for Turkish Sales Law?" The original
paper will be published, in Turkish. in the Conference Proceedings. The author wishes
to express his very deep gratitude to Associate Professor Yesim M. A tamer of
Istanbul Bilgi University, who organized a truly superb conference, substantially
advanced the cause of uniform international sales Jaw, and made all who participated
feel most welcome and comfortable in the wonderful city of Istanbul.
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980. S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9. 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan.
1.. 1988) [hereinafter "CISG" or '·Convention"].
2 Peter SchJechtriem. Preface to the COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) at v (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
Schwenzer eds .. 2d English ed. 2005); see also Peter Huber. Some introdllcrory

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1144182
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glowing assessment is confirmed by the fact that, as this is written, the
CISG is in force in seventy countries,3 and countries continue to ratify.4
The most significant challenge arising from the CISG's success is how to
maintain the Convention as a source of uniform international sales rules
(its primary function) when it is being applied by courts, arbitral tribunal.,
and lawyers in such a large group of countries with diverse domestic legal
cUltures. 5 Article 7(1) of the Convention obligates all Contracting States
to interpret the Convention from an international perspective and with a
view to maintaining uniformity in its application. There is consensus
among CISG commentators that one important tool in fulfilling this obli
gation is consultation of past CISG decisions, particularly those rendered
by tribunals in jurisdictions other than that of the interpreter. 6 An
impressive variety of tools for gaining access to such "foreign" decisions
have evolved. These include Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
("CLOUT"), the UNCITRAL system for disseminating abstracts of deci
sions in the six official languages of the United Nations 7; the UNILEX
database sponsored by the Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law

remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES HANDELSREICHT 228, 228 (2006) ("It is
therefore fair to say that the CISG has in fact been one of the success stories in the
field of the international unification of private law.").
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"),
Status: 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, http://www .unci tral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraUexts/sale_goods/1980CrSG_
status.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
4 As this is written the most recent CISG ratification was by EI Salvador, which
ratified on November 27, 2006 and where the Convention will enter into force on
December 1, 2007. See id.

5 No dedicated or specialized courts were created to hear disputes governed by the
CrSG. Instead, the Convention is applied by regular courts of competent jurisdiction
or by arbitral tribunals designated by the parties.
6 See, e.g., Antonio Boggiano, The Experience of Latin American States in
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE: ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD
CONGRESS ON PRIVATE LAW HELD BY THE JNTERNAT10NAL JNST1TUTE FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 47 (1988); V. Susanne Cook, The UN. Convention on

Contracts for the Intemational Sale of Goods: A Mandate 10 Abandon Legal
Ethnocel1lricity, 16 J. L. & COM. 257.263 (1997); Franco Ferrari. CISG Case Law: A
New Challenge for Intelpreters?, 17 J. L. & COM. 245, 246-47. 259 (1998): Harry M.
Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages under the UN. Sales Convention
(CISG): The Role of Case Law in the New International Commercial Practice, with
Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, 22 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
121. 122-23 (2002); Peter Schlechtriem. Article 7, supra note 2. at 97; V. Susanne
Cook. The UN. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A
Mandate 10 Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J. L. & COM. 257. 263 (1997).
7 For information on the CLOUT system, and access to CLOUT abstracts, see the
UNCJTRAL website. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/case_law.htmL

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1144182
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Studies in Rome 8 ; and the extraordinary CISG website maintained by the
Institute of International Commercial Law at Pace University School of
Law. 9 Another extremely useful tool is the "UNCITRAL Digest of Case
Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods," which provides an article-by-article textual guide to decisions
that apply the CISG. lO
The purposes of this paper are to provide an overview of one of the
more important parts of the Convention, and to sample some decisions
rendered thereunder in order to measure how well decision makers are
observing the mandate of Article 7(1) and its goal of interpreting the
CISG in a fashion that promotes uniform international application. The
chosen subject is Part III, Chapter II, Section II of the CISG, entitled
"Conformity of the goods and third party claims."l1 This division of the
Convention encompasses ten provisions (Articles 35-44) that address a
central question for any regime of sales law: in what circumstances maya
buyer claim that goods the seller has delivered failed to satisfy the seller's
contractual obligations? The provisions of Section II can be divided into
two groups: Articles 35-37 and 41-42 describe a seller's obligations con
cerning the quality and quantity of goods covered by a contract for sale,
as well as the legal rights in the goods that the buyer is to receive; Articles
38-40 and 43-44 specify the procedures the buyer must follow to preserve
its claims for breach of the foregoing obligations, as well as the legal
effect of failing to follow those procedures. The following discussion will
follow these groupings.
The provisions in Part III, Chapter II, Section II are, in actual practice,
among the most important in the Convention. For example, complaints
about the quality of delivered goods, a matter governed by one of those
provisions (Article 35), may well be the most frequently asserted claims
by buyers under the CISG. 12 Such claims are advanced not only in buy
ers' suits against sellers,13 but also as a defense in sellers' suits to collect
8 UNILEX is available free-of-charge at http://www.unilex.info. The service also
covers the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
9 This website is available free-of-charge at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
10 The Digest is available in the six official U.N. languages through the "Case Law
(CLOUT)" section of the UNCITRAL website (http://www.uncitral.org/uncitraJ/en/
index.html) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law]. The English-language
version is also aVililable on the Pace CISG website, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
11 CISG, supra note 1. arts. 35-44.
12 As of this writing, the CISG website maintained by the Pace University Center
for International Legal Education (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/) lists 275 cases that
have applied Article 35, which governs the seller's obligation as to the quality of
goods covered by a contract of sale. See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cgi-bin/isearch?
DATABASE=cases2&SEA RCH_TYPE=ADVANCED& ISEARCH3ERM=
articles % 2F35&ELEMENT_SET=TITLE&MAXHITS=500.
13 See, e.g., TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH. No. 00 Civ. 5189
(RCC). 2006 WL 2463537 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006); Obergericht des Kantons Zug
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the price of delivered goodsY In addition, the seller's obligations relat
ing to the quantity and packaging of delivered goods, the property rights
in the goods that the buyer is to receive, and the freedom from intellec
tual property claims the buyer can expect - matters encompassed by Arti
Cles 35-37 and 41-42 - are of considerable (and in some cases growing)
significance. Furthermore, Section II's important and controversial rules
on the steps a buyer must take to preserve its Claims relating to delivered
goods (ArtiCles 38-40 and 43-44) are invoked in CISG litigation with
remarkable frequency.15
Given the number of decisions that have applied Section II provisions
(as well as the many scholarly commentaries thereon), and the crucial
importance of the issues addressed in those provisions, it would take sev
eral full volumes to address ArtiCles 35-44 comprehensively. This artiCle
merely provides a glimpse of a few of the significant issues that have
arisen under those provisions and in so doing, identifies several of the
more important themes and challenges that arise from the attempt to cre
ate a uniform international sales law. 16
II.
A.

PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE SELLER'S OBLIGATIONS

Article 35: Seller's Obligations Concerning Quality

ArtiCle 35 of the Convention governs the seller's obligations with
respect to the "quantity, quality and description" as well as the packaging
of the goods being sold. 17 The basic rule in this area is stated in Article
35(1): The goods must conform to the requirements of the contract. In
other words, the parties' agreement defines the seller's obligations con
cerning the quality (as well as the quantity and packaging) of the goods
that are to be delivered under the contract. ArtiCle 35(1) is thus consis
[Cantonal Court of Appeals] July 5, 2005 (Switz.), available al http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.
edu/cases/050705s1.html.
14 See, e.g., Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d
894,898 (7th Cir 2005); Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 23, 2005
(Austria), available al http://cisgw3.Jaw.pace.edu/cases/050523a3.html.
15 For example, at the time this is written the Pace University CISG website lists
375 cases that have applied Article 39, a provision that requires a buyer to notify the
seller of any claimed lack of conformity in delivered goods. See http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cgi-bin/isearch ?DATABASE=cases2&SEARCH_TYPE=ADVA NCED&I
SEARCH_TERM=articles % 2F39&ELEMENT_SET=TITLE&MAXHITS=500.
16 To bring even this modest goal within practical reach, this article does not
attempt to discuss certain provisions of Section II that focus on matters addressed
more extensively in other parts of the Convention. Thus the article will not further
discuss Article 36, which deals with questions relating to risk of loss, see Articles 66-70
of the Convention, or Article 37. which governs the seller's right to cure a non
conforming delivery prior to the contractual delivery date (an issue closely related to
the matters addressed in Articles 31-34 and 48).
17 CISG, supra note 1, art. 35.
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tent with a central principle of the Convention: the primacy of party
autonomy in defining the legal rights and duties that arise from a CISG
contract of sale. 1s Unlike some domestic systems of sales law, the Con
vention imposes no special requirements for creating contractual duties
relating to the quantity, quality or packaging of the goods. 19 cThe process
for creating the contractual obligations addressed in Article 35(1) is sim
ply the general contracting process described in Part II of the CISG
("Formation of the Contract") and in provisions of Part 1. 20
It is notable that Article 35(1) (as well as the rest of the Convention)
avoids using the term "warranty," which in the common law tradition
designates contractual obligations relating, inter alia, to the quality of
goods to be delivered. This is an overarching drafting principle employed
in the CISG: to avoid (where possible) terminology commonly used in
(and thus more likely to convey unintended meanings derived from)
domestic sales law, particularly where the terminology is associated with
a particular legal tradition. 21 This methodology aims at avoiding what has
been termed the "homeward trend" - the tendency to see the interna
tional text of the CISG through the lens of preconceptions derived from
domestic law. 22 The methodology is part of the effort to create sales rules
that will be interpreted and applied "autonomously" - i.e., in a fashion
18 See, e.g., JOHN o. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 4 (3d ed. 1999).
19 U.S. law, for example. once required the use of special terminology in order to
impose an obligation on a seller to deliver goods of a particular quality. Cf u.e.e.
§ 2-313(3) (abrogating any requirement the parties employ expressions such as
"warrant" or "guarantee" in order to create an express warranty concerning the
quality of goods covered by a contract of sale).
20 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9 (interpretation of the parties' expressions
and actions and the role of usages and practices in defining the parties' obligations).
21 See "Guide to the Pace Database on the CISG and International Commercial
Law" in the CISG website maintained by the Pace University Institute for
International Commercial Law at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgiguide.html(..The
drafters of the CISG did not use ... domestic analogs [for concepts employed in the
Convention] hecause they did not want to carry them forward with their domestic
baggage. The legislative intent is to have the CISG interpreted autonomously, without
reference to such baggage."); HONNOLD, supra note 18. § 17 at 15 (referencing "[t]he
effort, in drafting the Convention, to avoid legal idioms that have divergent local
meanings").
22 The phrase "homeward trend"' was coined by Professor John O. Honnold, a
former Secretary of UNCITRAL who was intimately involved in the creation of the
Convention and who is the leading U.S. commentator on the CISG. See John O.
Honnold, II/traduction to DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATJONAL SALES 1 (John O. Honnold ed., 1989). For further discussion of the
phenomenon. see Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the clse in a
Decentralized 5,'stem: Observations on Translations, Reservations and other
Challenges 10 the Ul1lformity Principle in Article 7(}). 17 J.L. & COM. 187,200 nn. 48
49 and accompanying text (1998).
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(as expressed in Article 7(1)) that reflects the Convention's "interna
tional character" and the need for "uniformity in its application."
Article 35(2) fine-tunes the rule of party autonomy in Article 35(1) by
identifying obligations concerning the quality and packaging of the goods
that the parties are presumed to have intended unless they affirmatively
agree otherwise. These implied quality and packaging obligations
("implied" in the sense that they arise automatically, without the parties
affirmatively agreeing to them) include requirements that the goods: be
"fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordi
narily be used; be fit for particular purposes "expressly or impliedly made
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract" (unless
the circumstances show a lack of reasonable reliance by the buyer on the
seller's skill and judgment); have the same qualities as any "sample or
model" that the seller has held out to the buyer; and be "contained or
packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such
manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.,,23
The second and third of the implied obligations described in Article
35(2) - that the goods be fit for particular purposes disclosed by the
buyer to the seller by the time the contract was concluded, and that the
goods conform to any sample or model that the seller had held out to the
buyer - do not arise automatically in every sale: they are triggered only if
one of the parties has taken specified actions. Thus Article 35(2) is only
implicated if the buyer informs the seller, at or before the time of con
tract conclusion, that it intends to use the goods for a particular purpose.
Similarly, Article 35(2)(c) is triggered only if the seller shows the buyer a
sample or model of the goods covered by the contract. The obligations in
Article 35(2)(a) and (d), in contrast, arise in every contract for sale gov
erned by the Convention, unless the parties agree otherwise. Because
they describe general obligations applicable in the full range of sale of
contracts governed by the CISG, subparts (a) and (d) by necessity
employ very broad and flexible standards: Article 35(2)(a) refers to the
"ordinary" purposes of goods of the "same description"; Article 35(2)(d)
cites the "usual" manner of containing or packaging the goods or, in the
alternative, a manner that is "adequate to preserve and protect them.,,24
As mentioned above, the drafters of the Convention attempted to create
a text that avoids confusion with domestic law concepts, that can be inter
preted autonomously from an international perspective, and that can be
applied uniformly by fora working in vastly different systems and legal
traditions. The necessarily vague standards in Article 35(2)(a) and (d),
however, create a real danger that they will be interpreted in a manner
that unconsciously reflects the training and conceptions - what might be
called the "ideology" - of the domestic law in which those interpreting
23 ClSG. supra note L
24 Id. art. 35(2)(d).

art. 35(2)(a)-(d).
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and applying them are trained. In other words, these provisions are par
ticularly susceptible to the pernicious influence of the "homeward trend."
This is a particular concern with respect to Article 35(2)(a), which
describes one of the most substantively significant concepts of the Con
vention - the basic standard of quality that a buyer is entitled to expect
(unless it affirmatively agrees to forego it) in sales governed by the CISG.
A prominent issue that has arisen under Article 35(2)(a) illustrates the
intractability of the "homeward trend" when tribunals interpret this pro
vision, even where the interpreters have made good faith efforts to avoid
the problem. The issue is whether a seller who knows or should know
that the buyer intends to resell in its own State is obliged to deliver goods
that meet the applicable regulatory requirements of that State if the par
ties did not refer to those regulations in their negotiations or final agree
ment. The argument for the buyer is that, if the goods purchased for
resale purposes cannot legally be resold in the intended jurisdiction, the
goods are not "fit for the purposes for which goods of the same descrip
tion would ordinarily be used" as per Article 35(2)(a). The seller's argu
ment is that it cannot be expected to know the laws of the buyer's State
but the buyer can; thus as long as the goods could be resold in the seller's
own State, the seller's obligations under Article 35(2)(a) should be
deemed fulfilled.
The highest German court with jurisdiction in CISG cases - the
Bundesgerichtshof ("BGH") - has addressed this issue in one of the best
known decisions in CISG jurisprudence: the "Mussels Case.,,25 The Swiss
seller in this case delivered mussels from New Zealand to the German
buyer's storage facility in Germany, where they were inspected and deter
mined to contain cadmium at levels exceeding those recommended (but
not mandated) in German health regulations. After notifying the seller
of the cadmium problem,26 the buyer refused to pay and asked the seller
to take the mussels back. In other words, the buyer attempted to avoid
the contract. 27 Avoidance requires the buyer to show that the seller has
committed a "fundamental breach,"28 but in the seller's subsequent
action to recover the price, the BGH found that the buyer had failed to
show that the seller had breached at all. The buyer argued that the exces
sive cadmium levels in the mussels meant that the seller failed to meet its
obligation under Article 35(2)(a) to deliver goods "fit for the purposes
for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used" (as
well as its Article 35(2)(b) obligation to deliver goods "fit for any particu
25 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] March 8, 1995 (F.R.G.),
available al http://cisgw3.law.pace.eduicases/950308g3.html.
26 The buyer would have lost the right to remedies based on the elevated cadmium
levels had it not given the seller notice specifying the problem within a reasonable
time after the buyer discovered (or ought to have discovered) it. See infra Part Ill.
27 CISG, supra note 1, art. 81.
28 ld. arts. 41(1)(a), 25.
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lar purposes expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time
of the conclusion of the contract"). The BGH, however, held that Article
35(2) did not, on the facts of this case, require the seller to deliver goods
that complied with the "specialized" public regulations of the buyer's
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the seller cannot normally be
expected to be familiar with those requirements (and thus should not be
liable for failure to meet those standards) unless one of three exceptions
applied: 1) if the seller's own jurisdiction imposed the same standards; 2)
if the buyer had pointed out the regulations to the seller; or 3) if the seller
knew or should have been aware of the standards because of "special
circumstances" - i.e., the seller maintained a branch in the buyer's juris
diction, had a long-term business relationship with the buyer, or regularly
exported to or promoted its products in the buyer's jurisdiction. Because
none of these exceptions were applicable, the court affirmed the lower
courts' ruling that the seller was entitled to collect the price of the
mussels.
The BGH has confirmed this opinion in later decisions,29 and it has
been followed outside Germany. For example, it was invoked by two dif
ferent tribunals that heard a dispute between a U.S. buyer and an Italian
seller over the purchase of medical equipment that failed to meet U.S.
safety regulations. 3D The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the
panel cited the BGH Mussels Case and concluded that the situation fell
into one of the decision's described exceptions to the usual rule that the
seller is not responsible for meeting public law standards applicable to the
goods in the buyer's jurisdiction. The panel held that the Italian seller
was required, under Article 35, to comply with the U.S. regulations
because there were "special circumstances" suggesting that the seller
should have been familiar with those regulations. 3l The seller challenged
this holding in a U.S. federal court, arguing that the arbitral panel had not
properly applied the approach of the BGH. TIle U.S. court, however,
refused to overturn the ruling of the arbitral panel, reasoning that "[iJt is
clear from the arbitrators' written findings ... that they carefully consid
ered [the BGH] decision and found that this case fit the exception and
not the rule as articulated in that decision."32 Thus both the arbitration
panel and the U.S. court accepted the approach adopted by the BGH in
the Mussels Case. These are encouraging examples of fora working to
29 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] March 2. 2005
(F.R.G.). available al http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050302g1.html.
30 See Med. Mktg lnt'! Inc. v. lnternazionale Medico Scientifica. S.r.1.. No.CIV.A.
99-0380.1999 WL 311945 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999).
31 Id. (suggesting that the seller maintained a branch office in the U.S. - one of the
"special circumstances" which. according to the BGH opinion in the Mussels Case,
constituted an exception to tbe rule that the seller is not expected to know the public
law regulations of the buyer's jurisdiction.)
32 Id. at "2.
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view the Convention from an international perspective 33 as mandated by
CISG Article 7(1).34
Thus it is clear that the Mussels Case has become an internationally
accepted guide to the question of whether a seller is obligated under Arti
cle 35(2) to deliver goods that meet the public law standards in the
buyer's jurisdiction. The decision fully deserves the respect and authority
it has been accorded: it is the well-reasoned and carefully-researched
product of an extremely well-qualified tribunal - the highest court with
jurisdiction in CISG matters in one of the largest and most commercially
sophisticated CISG Contracting States, and a forum with extensive expe
rience interpreting and applying the Convention. 35 In addition, the court
considered "a broad spectrum of German and foreign authorities"36 on
the question of whether a seller must comply with the public law stan
dards of the buyer's jurisdiction. The deference due a CISG opinion is
based on how well it satisfies Article 7(1)'s mandates to interpret the
Convention with regard for its international character and the need to
33 See Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary, Conformity of the goods and standards
established by public law: Treatment of foreign court decision as precedent, http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990517ul.html ("the decision of the U.S. federal court is
remarkable because it treats a foreign court decision as precedent, or at the least as
'authority'.... In other words, it treated the CISG as a kind of international common
law, the application and development of which is in the hands of the courts of aJl
nations party to the Convention, which must therefore also give consideration to
decisions made in other countries - in this case, 'the law as articulated by the German
Supreme Court.' ").
34 U.S. courts have not always adopted this approach. See Joseph Lookofsky &
Harry Flechtner, Nominating Manfred Forberich: The Worst CISG Decision in 25
Years? 9 YINDOBONA J. INT'L COMM. L. & ARB. 199 (2005); see generally Harry M.
Flechtner, The CISG in
Courts: The Evolution (and Devolution) of the
Methodology of Interpretation, in Quo VADIS CISG?: Celebrating the 25th
Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (Franco Ferrari ed., 2005).
35 The Mussels Case, decided in 1995, was at least the third CISG decision issued
by the BGH, in addition to four decisions it had issued earlier that applied one of the
CISG's predecessor sales conventions, the "Uniform Law for International Sales"
(ULlS). See Pace Law School CISG Database. Country Case Schedule, http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#Bundesgerichtshof (last visited Mar. 23,
2008). The BGB issued at least twenty additional CISG decisions prior to its March 2,
2005 decision reconfirming the approach adopted in the Mussels Case (see supra note
29 and accompanying text).
36 Peter
Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the
Bundesgerichtshof http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schJech triem3 .htm!. In
addition to a large number of German authorities, the BGH cited French and
English-language commentaries in support of the proposition that a seller normally
need not supply goods that meet the speciaJ public Jaw standards of the buyer's
jurisdiction. See the Mussels Case, supra note 25, § II.l.b.bb.
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promote uniformity in its application. 37 Consulting foreign authority
when interpreting the CISG is a crucial technique for pursuing the Article
7(1) mandates - and the fact that the BGH opinion did so is an excellent
gauge of its success in this endeavor.
Despite the admirable achievements of the BGH in the Mussels Case,
the opinion nevertheless contains elements that suggest, at a deep and
very subtle level, a failure to realize completely an international perspec
tive on the Convention - in other words, elements that suggest the
"homeward trend." The court announced a moderately elaborate system
for dealing with the issue of a seller's implied responsibility for ensuring
that goods meet the standards imposed by the public laws of the buyer's
jurisdiction: a general rule (seller not responsible unless it expressly
promises to meet these standards) and three exceptions to that general
rule (seller is impliedly responsible under Article 35(2) if the seller's own
jurisdiction has equivalent requirements, if the buyer draws the seller's
attention to the standards, or if "special circumstances" - i.e., the seller
maintains a branch in the buyer's jurisdiction, or regularly exports or
markets its products there - puts the seller on notice of the standards).
The court announced this system despite the fact that it did not have the
benefit of extensive, or even scattered, case law on the issue from outside
of Germany (although it could, and did, consult German and foreign
commentary on the topic), and even though the situation before it did not
implicate much of the announced doctrine (specifically, the case did not
trigger any of the three exceptions to the court's general rule).
This approach of announcing an elaborate doctrine that goes well
beyond what is necessary to decide the current dispute, despite the fact
that experience with the issue is limited, seems typical of, and appropriate
for, a legal system's highest court: such a tribunal has the responsibility
and the power to provide authoritative guidance to lower tribunals. But
the BGH is not the final arbiter in the legal system of the Convention.
There is no such final arbiter, no "Supreme Court of the CISG" with
authority over all other tribunals that deal with disputes governed by the
Convention. Rather, the CISG is applied in a decentralized and "fed
eral" global judicial system 38 in which a tribunal - whatever its authority
within its own domestic system - enjoys, at best, a power to persuade
other fora outside its jurisdiction. Furthermore, for the Convention's
purposes, it is extremely important that interpretation be informed by
diverse perspectives, in order that uniform international sales law indeed
be acceptable (and uniformly interpreted) in the great variety of legal and
37 Harry M. Flechtner. Recovering Allorneys' Fees as Damages under the UN. Sales
Convention (CISG): The Role of Case Law in the New International Commercial
Practice, with Commenls 0/1 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores. S.A. v. Hearthside Baking
Co.. 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 121. 144-45 (2002).
38 See Flechtner, The Several TeXiS of the clse in a Decentralized System. supra
note 22 nn. 85-91 and accompanying text.
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economic systems around the globe. For example, from the perspective
of developing countries it may well be important that considerations of
the parties' relative sophistication and bargaining power playa role in
determining when a seller should be held responsible for complying with
standards imposed in the buyer's jurisdiction. Those considerations do
not appear in the rule announced by the BGH. The court can hardly be
blamed that its opinion does not reflect developing countries' perspec
tive, as that perspective was not well represented in the available CISG
resources when the opinion was rendered. But the lack of such input
counsels caution before announcing an elaborate rule that appears to
have been intended to be exhaustive. 39 For example, the BGH might
have treated the elements it identified - the unlikelihood that sellers will
nonnally be familiar with the special public law regulations of the buyer's
jurisdiction, and the exceptional circumstances where such familiarity can
be expected - as considerations for a rule to be developed after the issue
had been explored by other tribunals, and confined itself to announcing
merely that the seller had not breached the contract on the facts of the
particular case. Such an approach might have been more in keeping with
the mandates of Article 7(1) and the purposes of the Convention.
The foregoing, however, is hardly a criticism of the BGH opinion in the
Mussels Case. In fact, that opinion is one of the most sophisticated, suc
cessful and "international" applications of the CISG to date - a remarka
ble achievement, particularly given that the decision was rendered early
in the development of CISG jurisprudence. Indeed, the foregoing analy
sis merely illustrates how intractable - indeed (in its subtler forms) ines
capable - the problem of the "homeward trend" is. A commentator from
the United States, where the courts have often been notably unsuccessful
in achieving an international perspective on the CISG, and have at times
even embraced an interpretational approach that incorporates a con
scious "homeward trend",40 is hardly in a position to throw stones.

B.

Articles 41 & 42: Seller's Obligations Concerning Third Party
Claims of Ownership and Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights

Article 41 of the CISG obliges the seller to "deliver goods which are
free from any right or claim of a third party, unless the buyer agreed to
39 As Professor Schlechtriem has stated, "one must nonetheless hope that this
decision is not yet the final word on this question." Schlechtriem, supra note 36. at 12.
The BGH, of course, might well deem consideration of the parties' relative
sophistication and power relevant in determining whether a party has acted in good
faith, but the question of whether the Convention imposes on parties an obligation to
act in good faith is itself controversial, and invoking the good faith doctrine would
smack of a civil law (and particularly German) approach.
40 See Lookofsky & FJechtner. Nominating Manfred Forberich. slIpra note 40:
Flechtner, The ClSG in American COLITIs. supra note 40.
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take the goods subject to that right or claim. ,,41 In other words, the seller
must transfer the property in (good title to) the goods to the buyer, so
that the buyer can enjoy the use of what it purchased without interfer
ence from another claiming to be the true owner of the goods. Article 41,
however, deals only with the seller's obligations with regard to transfer
ring ownership rights - the question of what property the seller has in fact
transferred to the buyer is, as Article 4(b) explicitly declares, beyond the
scope of the Convention, and is left to applicable (presumably domestic)
law. Thus, non-Convention law governing the question of who owns
goods that have been delivered pursuant to a contract of sale must be
consulted to determine whether the seller has met or breached its obliga
tions under Article 41 of the Convention. The obligations imposed by
Article 41 are "implied" in the sense that they arise even if the parties
have not affirmatively expressed the intent to impose them on the seller.
The parties can, however, relieve the seller of those obligations by dero
gating from Article 41 Gust as they can derogate from any other provision
of the CISG except Article 12).42 One can imagine a variety of issues that
could arise under Article 41,43 but in fact only a modest number of deci
sions have addressed the provision. 44
The second sentence of Article 41 makes a vital distinction: it declares
that, if a third party's right or claim "is based on industrial property or
other intellectual property, the seller's obligation is governed by article
42.,,45 Article 42(1), in turn, requires a seller to deliver goods that are
"free from any" such right or claim, but the obligation is subject to a
number of severe restrictions: the seller is liable for a third party's intel
lectual property claim only if the seller "knew or could not have been
unaware" of such claim, and even then only if the claim arose under the
laws of the State designated by Article 42(1)(a) or (b).46 Under these
subsections, the relevant laws are those of either the State where, at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, the parties contemplated the goods
would be "used or resold," or (absent such contemplation) "the State
where the buyer has his place of business." Finally, Article 42(2) - appar
CISG, supra note 1, art. 41.
See id. art. 6.
43 For example, the BGH has recently noted that whether there are limits to the
seller's liability under Article 41 based on the invalidity of a third party's claim to the
goods - i.e., whether the seller is liable if a third party asserts a claim "pulled out of
thin air" - is a matter of theoretical dispute, although in the case before it the court
found that resolving issue was unnecessary. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice] Jan. 11, 2006 (F.G.R.). available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/
060111g1.html. See discussion infra Part III.
44 As of this writing. the CISG website lists eleven decisions that have invoked
Article 41. See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/dlgest-cases-41.html.
45 CISG. supra note 1. art. 41.
46 Id. art. 42(1).
41

42
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ently building on assumption of risk principles 47 - relieves the seller of
even the limited obligations imposed by Article 42(1) if the buyer "knew
or could not have been unaware" of the third party's right or claim when
the contract was concluded (Article 42(2)(a)); the seller also has no liabil
ity if the buyer furnished "technical drawings, designs, formulae or other
such specifications" to be used in producing the goods, and the third
party's right or claim arose from the seller's compliance with those
instructions (Article 42(2)(b)).
As of this writing, Article 42 has generated even less litigation than
Article 41. 48 That may change, however, as the importance of intellectual
property in global commerce grows, particularly if questions concerning
the extent to which the CISG governs transactions in computer software
are resolved in favor the Convention's applicability.49 The protections
offered by Article 42 are quite modest, and perhaps inadequate to offer a
buyer reasonable safeguards if the goods it purchases turn out to violate
some third party's intellectual property rights. In particular, limiting the
buyer's protection to intellectual property claims of which the seller
"knew or could not have been unaware" presents very difficult proof
problems to a buyer asserting a claim under Article 42. Incidentally,
most authorities believe that the burden of proving the elements of the
CISG provisions is an issue that is itself governed by the Convention,50
47 See UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods Art. 42 <j[ 1, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/case_law/
digests/cisg.html.
48 As of this writing, the CISG website lists only ten decisions that have invoked
Article 42. See http://www.cisg.Jaw.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-cases-42.htm1.
49 For commentary on this issue, see for example Franco Ferrari, The CISG's
sphere of application: Articles 1-3 and 10, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND
BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES
CONVENTION 21, 77-78 (Franco Ferrari. Harry Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand eds ..
2004); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT
GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 2.5 (2d ed. 2004); Peter Schlechtriem, Article 1, in
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 28. Frank Diedrich. The
CISG and Computer Software Revisited, 6 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COMM. L. & ARB. 55
(Supp. 2002); Arthur Fakes, The Application of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the Sale of Goods to Computer, Software and Database Transactions, 3
SOFTWARE LJ. 559 (1990): L. Scot Primak, Complller Software: Should the u.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Apply? A Contextual
Approach to the Question, 11 COMPuTERlLJ. 197 (1991).
50 See Franco Ferrari, Scope of application: Articles 4-5. in DRAFT UNCITRAL
DIGEST AND BEYOND, supra note 49. at 96; Franco Ferrari, Burden of Proof under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ClSG).
in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT'L SALE OF GOODS 1
(2000-2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferrari5.htmJ; Sonja
Kruisinga. (NON-)CONFORMITY IN THE 1980 UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A UNIFORM CONCEPT? 157-86 (2004): Peter
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although with very few exceptions the matter is not expressly addressed
and must be resolved by referring to the general principles upon which
the Convention is based pursuant to Article 7(2). I am among those
(apparently few) who argue that the matter is beyond the scope of the
CISG and is governed by applicable non-Convention law. 51 It is likely,
however, that the burden of proving the elements of Article 42 would be
allocated to the buyer under either approach. If a buyer is concerned
about possible intellectual property problems with the goods, it may be
well advised to derogate from Article 42 and substitute more robust con
tractual protections - although extracting such a concession from the
seller will certainly cost the buyer something.

III.

THE BUYER'S OBLIGATION TO EXAMINE THE GOODS AND GIVE

NOTICE OF LACK OF CONFORMITY - ARTICLES

38-40

& 43-44
When goods are delivered, Article 38(1) imposes an obligation on the
buyer to "examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances. ,,52 Article 39(1)
requires a buyer to give the seller notice specifying a claimed lack of con
formity in delivered goods "within a reasonable time after [the seller] has
discovered it or ought to have discovered it.,,53 These two articles are
Schlechtriem, Article 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION, supra note 2, at
65; Ulrich Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 3 INT'L TRADE & Bus. L.
ANN. 33, 52 & nn. 86-91 (1997). See also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] January 9, 2002 (FR.G .), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/
020109g1.html; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 30, 2004
(FR.G.), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/040630gl.html; UNCITRAL
Digest of case law, supra note 47, art. 4. ~ 4 n. 9.
51 See Harry M. Flechtner. Moving through Tradition Towards Universalism under
the u.N. Sales Convention (CISG): Notice of Lack of Conformity (Article 39) and
Burden of Proof in the Bundesgerichtshof Opinion of 30 .lune 2004, in LIBER
MEMORIALIS PETAR SARCEVIC UNIVERSALISM, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL
459.466-70 (1. Erauw, V. Tomljenovic & P. Volken eds .. 2006); W. Khoo, Article 2, in
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION 39 (eM. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds. 1987) (citing Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, Mar. 10-Apr. 11 1980,295-98,
U.N.Doc. A/CONF97/19 (1981); UNCITRAL Digest of case law. supra note 47, art.
4, ~ 4 n. 10.
52 The other subsections of Article 38 (Article 38(2) and (3» contain rules that
defer the time for the buyer's examination in certain circumstances.
53 The other subsection of Article 39 (Article 39(2» imposes a two-year final
deadline (measured from the time the goods were "actually handed over to the
buyer") for giving the required notice of lack of conformity. unless tlUs two-year time
limit is "inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee." The two-year cut-off for
giving notice applies regardless of when a buyer "ought to have discovered" a claimed
lack of conformity. Thus, absent an inconsistent "contractual period of guarantee,"

2008]

GOODS AND NOTICE THEREOF UNDER ClSG

15

among most frequently-invoked CISG provisions in reported decisions.
At the time this is written, the CISG website maintained by the Pace
University Institute for International Commercial Law lists 245 decisions
that cite Article 38 and 375 decisions that invoke Article 39. This "popu
larity" may have its roots in the consequences that Article 39(1) imposes
if a buyer fails to satisfy the provision's notice requirements: the buyer
loses the right to "rely on" a lack of conformity for which it did not give
the seller adequate notice. In other words (subject to some exceptions
discussed below), the buyer loses the right to all remedies for a claimed
lack of conformity if the notice requirement is not satisfied. 54 The very
severe consequences attached to the failure to give the required notice,
combined with Article 39's quite vague standards for adequate notice 
When "ought" a buyer have discovered a lack of conformity? How long is
the "reasonable time" for giving notice? How specific must the notice be
in describing the lack of conformity? - mean that sellers defending a
claim that the goods are non-conforming have strong reasons for wanting
to claim a lack of adequate notice, and can often make a plausible argu
ment on that score. 55 Article 38 is frequently invoked along with Article
39 because the time that Article 38 sets for examining the goods will often
be the time the buyer "ought to have discovered" a lack of conformity 
and thus will set the clock ticking on the buyer's reasonable time for giv
ing notice under Article 39(1).
Some decisions - particularly decisions by German tribunals - have set
standards for the "reasonable time" within which Article 39(1) notice
must be given, as well as for the specificity with which such notice must
describe the claimed lack of conformity, that appear unduly strict. 56 As I
have stated elsewhere:
The ultimate goal of the Convention is not to induce buyers to give
the notice required by Article 39, but rather to validate the reasona
ble expectations of the parties to an international sales contract. ...
The consequences of a finding that the buyer failed to give proper
notice are substantial: the loss of all remedies for even the most real
and serious non-conformities. Thus, a decision finding that a buyer
two years after delivery a buyer will lose all rights to claim that the goods were non
conforming even if the buyer could not reasonably have discovered the lack of
conformity within those two years.
54 It is worth noting that Article 39 imposes a notice requirement on a "defect-by
defect" basis. Thus a buyer make give adequate notice to the seller as to some but not
all claimed non-conformities in the goods; in that case, the buyer retains its rights with
respect to defects that have been the subject of proper notice. but loses rights as to
defects for which adequate notice was not given.
55 See Harry M. Flechtner, Bllyer's obligation to give notice of lack of conformity
(Articles 38,39, 40 and 44). in DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND, supra note
49. at 377-78.
56 Id. at 379-85
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has failed to fulfill its Article 39 notice requirement, even where the
seller has suffered no prejudice because of tardy or vague notice,
elevates a secondary and instrumental duty under the Convention to
one that is on a par with, and even supersedes, a primary and ulti
mate duty under the CISG - the seller's obligation to deliver goods
that conform to the contract. ... That is a miscarriage of justice that
presents a more than trivial threat to the achievement of a workable
and widely-accepted system of international sales law. 57
A recent decision (January 11, 2006) in which the BGH applied a pro
vision that mirrors Article 39(1) illustrates the continuing challenges sur
rounding the Convention's notice requirements. The provision at issue,
Article 43(1), obliges a buyer to notify the seller of third party claims that
the buyer believes give rise to a violation of the seller's obligations under
Articles 41 or 4258 ; the notice must "specify[ ] the nature of the right or
claim of the third party" and must be given "within a reasonable time
after [the buyer] has become aware or ought to have become aware of the
right or claim." Thus the obligation imposed by Article 43(1) closely par
allels that described in Article 39(1) - except that Article 39(1) deals with
notice that the seller has violated its obligations under Article 35,
whereas Article 43(1) addresses notice that the seller failed to comply
with Articles 41 or 42. 59 Because Articles 39(1) and 43(1) are so similar in
purpose, approach and wording, the two provisions should be construed
in a similar fashion, and case law interpreting one provision is relevant to
the interpretation of the other. 60
In the January 11, 2006 BGH case,61 a Dutch dealer had contracted to
purchase a used automobile from a German seller. The seller delivered
the car in early March 1999, but on August 23 the police impounded the
vehicle on suspicion it was stolen. By letter dated October 26, 1999 
slightly more than two months later - the buyer demanded that the seller
refund the purchase price, but the seller refused the demand. In letters to
the buyer dated May 16, and May 24, 2000, the insurance company that
had covered the loss of the owner from whom the automobile had alleg
edly been stolen (and who thus succeeded to the owner's rights)
demanded turnover of the vehicle. On December 8, 2000 the buyer sued

57

ld. at 385-86, 39l.

For a discussion of Articles 41 and 42, see supra Part II.B.
59 Claims that the seller has violated Articles 41 or 42 are much rarer than claims
that the goods are non-conforming under Article 35. See supra Part II.A. As a result,
many more decisions have applied Article 39(1) than have addressed Article 43(1).
60 See UNCITRAL Digest of case law, supra note 47. art. 43 ~ 2 ("those called
upon to interpret article 43(1) ... may look for guidance from the numerous decisions
that apply the parallel provisions of article 39 .
.").
61 BGH Jan. 11. 2006. supra note 43
58
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the seller in Germany for a refund,62 arguing that the seller had breached
its obligation under Article 41 to deliver goods that were "free from any
right or claim of a third party.... " The trial court found in favor of the
buyer, but the regional appeals court (Oberlandesgericht ("OLG"))
reversed. It held that the buyer had failed to notify the seller of the third
party claim within a reasonable time after the buyer became aware of the
claim as required by Article 43(1), and thus that the buyer had lost the
right to "rely on" the claimed breach of Article 41. In reaching its conclu
sions, the OLG appears to have applied a theory (sometimes referred to
as the "noble month" approach) that sets one month as the presumptive
"reasonable time" for a buyer to give notice, although the period might
be longer or shorter if a party can demonstrate unusual circumstances. 63
Thus (as recounted in the subsequent BGH decision) the OLG held that,
because the police seized the car on August 23, the buyer should have
notified the seller of that fact "within a month at the latest, i.e., by Sep
tember 23, 1999.,,64 Because the buyer did not give notice until October
26, Article 43(1) was not satisfied. Similarly, the OLG stated, the buyer
lost any rights under Article 41 based on the insurance company's claim
to the car (which the insurance company asserted in letters to the buyer
dated May 16 and 24, 2000) because the buyer had not complied with "a
notice deadline of at most one month,,65 - the first notice of the insurance
company's claim that the buyer gave the seller was the complaint in the
lawsuit, filed on December 8, 2000. The OLG therefore dismissed the
buyer's claim.
On appeal, the BGH appears to have rejected the OLG's presumption
that the usual "reasonable time" for giving notice is the "noble month."
The BGH commented: "The circumstances of each individual case are
decisive in measuring the time period, so that a schematic fixing of the
time for the notice of defect is impossible."66 This is an encouraging
development as it is improper to create specific presumptions regarding
what is a reasonable time when those presumptions are not found in the
text of the Convention itself. It would be different if examination of an
internationally diverse set of decisions had revealed that tribunals gener
ally found notice given beyond a month was too late unless there were
special circumstances; however, adopting a presumption merely because
it seems sensible to the decision-maker, and would make analysis easier,
is an invasion of the legislative function, as well as an infringement on the
sovereignty of States that ratified the Convention based on a text that did
not include the presumption. By adopting the "noble month" approach,
62 The buyer subsequently withdrew the complaint in this suit and then refiJed 
although this has no bearing on the matters discussed in the text.
63 See Flechtner. Buyer's obligation. supra note 55, at 379.
648GB Jan. 11. 2006, supra note 43.
65 ld.
66 ld.
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the OLG imposed on the Dutch buyer a presumptive deadline recognized
primarily (or even exclusively) by German courts. The unfairness of that,
as well as its inconsistency with the mandate in Article 7(1) to interpret
the CISG with regard for its "international character" and "the need to
promote uniformity in its application," is manifest.
Although the BGH rejected the "noble month" presumption behind
the OLG's analysis, it nevertheless affirmed the lower court's decision,
and it did so in a fashion that in effect adopts the noble month presump
tion in the case before it. In reviewing the OLG's holding that the buyer
had failed to give timely notice of the police seizure of the car, the BGH
stated:
The buyer must be granted a certain time period within which he can
get a general picture of the legal situation ...; the type of legal defect
must also be considered. Based on these standards, the [OLG]
determined legally correctly that a time period of more than two
months after the seizure was not within a reasonable period of
time.... [E]ven for a legal layperson such as [Buyer], the suspicion
of theft, made obvious by the police seizure, was easily recognized as
an especially significant occurrence without the need to secure legal
advice. It was possible and reasonable for [Buyer] to inform [Seller]
of the suspicion of theft by describing the actual occurrence, so that
[Seller] would be put in a position to refute any claims by a third
party as soon as possible, which is the purpose of the notice
obligation.... 67
Rather than reviewing de novo the OLG's conclusion that the buyer's
notice was too late (since that conclusion was based on improper method
ology - the "noble month" presumption), the BGH in essence presumed
that the lower court was correct unless the buyer could show differently.
This, I submit, ratifies rather than repudiates the lower court's
approach. 68 There is nothing in the foregoing analysis that explains why
the buyer's notice should be deemed too late, beyond the fact that it
would have been "possible and reasonable" for the buyer to give earlier
notice, and that earlier notice would have served what the court asserts is
the purpose of notice: to allow the seller "to refute any claims by a third
party as soon as possible.... " Requiring the buyer to give notice of third
party claims "as soon as possible" is a surprising (to say the least) inter
pretation of the phrase "reasonable time" in Article 43(1). Rather than
67

Id.

The BGH's approach to the question whether the buyer was late in giving notice
of the insurance company's claim to the car is even starker in its deference to the
OLG's improperly-founded analysis, and thus even clearer in its de facto ratification
of the invalid "nobJe month" approach: the court merely states. in conclusory fashion.
that the buyer "did not meet the deadline of Art. 43(1) CISG triggered by the
[insurance company's] turnover demand of May 2000. as correctly stated by the Court
of Appeals." Id.
68
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asking if the seller had suffered, or even was likely to have suffered, any
actual prejudice as a result of not receiving earlier notice,69 the court
relies on the theoretical possibility of such prejudice to justify a strict,
mechanical and formalistic application of the notice requirement.
The result is not, in my view, desirable: the buyer in the automobile
case may well have ended up with nothing for the thousands it paid the
seller, even though Article 41 was specifically designed to protect the
buyer against this eventuality. This extreme result flows entirely from the
fact that the buyer's lawyer was a little more than a month late in giving
the seller notice - and this despite the fact that there is no evidence the
seller suffered any ill consequences from failing to receive earlier notice.
Because the notice requirement shields the seller from liability for deliv
ering stolen goods, those from whom the seller might have sought reim
bursement had it been found liable - right down to the thief that stole the
car - may well be allowed to retain their profits, even if they acted
improperly.70 I would not reach such a patently unjust result absent a
much more compelling case that the buyer failed its notice obligations. In
my view, the BGH's approach to the notice issue produced neither fair
ness nor confidence in the international commercial system, and it did not
(as mandated by Article 7(1)) have regard for promoting "the observance
of good faith in international trade."
A substantially more egregious example - perhaps more properly
described as an "outlier" - illustrating the stiffly formalistic and pro-seller
approach that some German courts have taken to the buyer's obligation
to notify the seller of breach can be found in a 2005 trial court decision
involving the sale of used shoes to an Ugandan buyer. 71 The contract cov
ered a large number of shoes - "360 bags of used shoes, quality class one
and 360 bags of used shoes, quality class two (9,000 kg each)," for a total
price (including freight) of 30,750 _.72 The contract provided for delivery
"FOB Mombassa, Kenya." According to the court, "quality class one"
required "used shoes in a very good condition, i.e., without rips or holes
and if at all with only slight, minor signs of use" and "quality class two"
required "shoes of good quality, i.e., with slight signs of use, but also
without rips or holes.,,73 The goods arrived at Mombassa on April 26,
2004; the buyer paid the final installment on the purchase price on May
18, and the seller transferred the bill of lading on May 24. The buyer then
shipped the shoes to Uganda, where it examined them on June 16 and
69 I have argued elsewhere that, if a buyer can show that the seller suffered no
prejudice from late notice, the notice should be deemed given within a "reasonable
time." See Flechtner, Buyer's obligation, supra note 55. at 387-88.
70 But see infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
71 Landgericht Frankfurt [LG] [Trial Court] April 11, 2005 (ER.G.). available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.h tml.
72 !d.
73 ld.
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discovered they did not conform to the contract - the shoes were "defec
tive and unusable," and included such useless items as "in-line skates and
shoe trees.,,74 Indeed, on June 24 the Uganda National Bureau of Stan
dards refused import of the shoes because of their "bad and unhygienic
condition," declaring them "unfit for usage" and recommending "destruc
tion at the parties' cost. ,,75 In the meantime, the buyer had notified the
seller of the goods' lack of conformity on the day after it examined the
goods (June 17), and it sent another notice elaborating on the problems
on June 23. The seller, apparently, offered no relief, and so on July 2 the
buyer notified the seller that it was avoiding the contract. The buyer then
sued to recover the purchase price it had paid 76 plus damages for "costs
incurred such as customs, handling fees and freight costs" and interest. 77
The court found that the seller had committed a fundamental breach of
contracr7 8 which is a prerequisite for the buyer to avoid the contract. 79
The court specifically noted that the poor condition of the shoes was not
due to damage in storage because "the Seller itself has stated that shoes
are not perishable items and therefore cannot 'rot' in a container in a
warehouse.,,8o The court, however, ruled that the buyer had lost all rights
with respect to the seller's breach - not just the right to avoid the con
tract, but the right to any remedy - because "the Buyer did not examine
the goods soon enough and also did not give notice of the non-conformity
of the goods within a reasonable time" under Articles 38 and 39(1).81
Although the buyer's notice of lack of conformity came the very next day
after the buyer examined the goods and detected the problems, the court
explained that "[t]he examination of the goods, and consequently the
notice was ... too late."s2 It concluded that the buyer's examination was
too late under Article 38(1) and (2) because it did not occur until "more
than three weeks" after the buyer received the bill of lading following the
goods arrival in Mombassa,83 and that this "has to be regarded as too late
and unreasonable in international commerce."S4
74

75

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See

CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(2).
id. arts. 74, 78.
78
id. art. 25.
79
id. art. 49(1)(a).
80 Under the "FOB Mombassa" term of the contract, the seller would be
responsible for damage that occurred while the goods were in transit to that port,
even if the damage did not become "apparent" until later. See id. art. 36(1).
81 LG Apr. 11. 2005. supra note 71.
82 ld.
76

77

83 Id. The court ruled that. under Article 38(2), the time for examination did not
start until the goods arrived at their destination, which, under the contract's FOB
term. was Mombassa.
84 ld.
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The buyer, however, had argued that, under Article 38(3), its examina
tion could be deferred until the goods arrived in Uganda because at the
time the contract was concluded the seller "knew or ought to have known
of the possibility" that the goods would be "redispatched" to that coun
try85 and it was unreasonable to expect the buyer to examine the goods in
Mombassa. Examination in Mombassa was not a reasonable option, the
buyer argued, because of the extra expense of sending a representative of
the Ugandan buyer to Kenya, and because examination in Mombassa
would have entailed breaking the customs seal on the containers that held
the goods, thus triggering Kenyan customs duties. The court rejected this
reasoning:
The argument presented by the Buyer that it would have been unrea
sonable to fly from Uganda to Kenya to examine the goods is not
convincing. The Buyer ... did not need to fly to Kenya itself to
examine the goods. It could have ordered somebody else to examine
the goods . . . . In addition, the inconvenience of a flight from
Uganda to Kenya cannot be an argument against the Seller, as the
Buyer itself has chosen Mombassa as the goods' destination. It was
free to agree upon a different destination with the Seller .... The
argument that paying the [Kenyan] customs duties would have been
unreasonable, cannot be followed .... [I]t would have been possible
for the Buyer to agree upon Kampala, Uganda and not Mombassa,
Kenya as the destination of the goods. 86
Thus in the court's view, a buyer's agreement to a particular destina
tion for the goods eliminates any argument that the opportunity to
examine the goods at that destination is "unreasonable" as per Article
38(3). The same logic, presumably, would also preclude any argument
that examination at an agreed point of delivery might not be "practicable
in the circumstances" under Article 38(1). As the court saw it, by agree
ing to delivery of the shoes "FOB Mombassa," the buyer had agreed to
examine the goods in that city no matter how inconvenient or expensive
such examination was. Thus the court concluded: "As the examination
[of the goods] did not require much effort [sic!], the Seller could expect
that it would be conducted within a short period of time .... [T]he Buyer
has not presented any facts that would justify a longer period. ,,87
This decision represents an almost willful misreading of the notice
requirements of the Convention, and a gross miscarriage of justice. Its
approach violates the normal canons of interpretation because it renders
Article 38(3) a dead letter: that provision permits a buyer to defer exami
85 ld. The court questioned whether the buyer had satisfied this requirement for
Article 38(3) to apply but. given its conclusion that the buyer had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods in Mombassa, decided it need not resolve the
question.
86 ld.
87 ld.
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nation of redispatched goods until they arrive at their "new destination"
if, among other requirements, examination at the point from which the
goods are redispatched would be unreasonable. The court, however, indi
cates that examination where the buyer agreed the goods would origi
nally be shipped is by definition always reasonable. But when goods are
"redispatched," a buyer has always agreed (either expressly or by silence)
that they should be shipped to a point other than that to which they are
ultimately sent. Thus the court's approach appears to mean that the no
reasonable-opportunity-for-examination requirement of Article 38(3) will
never be met, and the provision can never be invoked. The court's
approach also eviscerates the language in Article 38(1) stating that exam
ination is not due until it is "practicable in the circumstances" since, the
court suggests, a buyer'S agreement that the goods will be shipped to a
particular point requires the buyer to examine them there no matter how
inconvenient or expensive.
Most disturbingly, the court adopts an untenable view of the relation
ship between Articles 38 and 39, thus leading it to a completely incorrect
- and horribly unjust - result. Note that, according to the court itself, the
buyer's time for examining the goods began to run on May 24, 2004, and
the buyer gave the seller notice of lack of conformity on June 17, 2004.
This is well within the "noble month" that German courts have generally
allowed buyers for giving notice of lack of conformity.88 Thus even if the
buyer was tardy in examining the goods, once it discovered the problems
it expedited its notice to the seller (it gave notice the very next day), and
as a result it met (indeed, it gave notice earlier than) the "reasonable
time" deadline normally imposed by German courts. How, then, did the
court end up concluding that the buyer's notice was too late, and thus
that the buyer had lost all rights to rely on the goods' shocking lack of
conformity? The court explains this point rather clearly: "[t]he examina
tion of the goods, and consequently the notice was ... too late. "89 In
other words, once the buyer was late in examining the goods it did not
matter how soon notice arrived: the tardy examination was fatal, and
even notice that arrived within the "reasonable time" normally allotted to
buyers would not suffice.
This aspect of the court's analysis leads to several insupportable conse
quences. First and foremost, it visits a catastrophic penalty on the buyer
even though it is demonstrable, as a matter of deductive logic, that the
seller suffered no prejudice from the timing of the buyer's examination.
Had the buyer examined the good in Mombassa (incurring the extra
expenses, including Kenyan customs duties, that would have entailed)
and discovered the shoes' lack of conformity at that time, it apparently
88 The goods involved were not perishable, nor in my view were there other factors
that would require quicker-than-usual notice. For a discussion of such factors. see
UNCITRAL Digest of case law. supra note 47. an. 39 ~ 21.
89 LG Apr. 11, 200S. supra note 71.
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could sit on its hands and wait to give the seller notice until June 23 - six
days after the seller received notice in the actual case - and all would
have been well: the buyer would have timely fulfilled its obligation to
examine the goods and (at least if the noble month approach were
adopted) to give notice. 90 If such hypothetical notice would have been
sufficient even though it would have arrived later than the notice the
seller actually received, then - obviously - the seller suffered no legally
cognizable prejudice from the buyer's June 17 notice.
Second, the court's approach - which conclusively presumes that a
buyer's notice is late if its examination was late - in effect applies the
remedy that the CISG specifies for violations of Article 39(1) to viola
tions of Article 38, despite the absence of any support for that approach
in the language or (to my knowledge) the history of Article 38. Although
Article 38 imposes an examination obligation on the buyer, it does not
specify the consequences for violating that obligation. My own view is
that there should be no consequences for late examination independent
of those specified in Article 39: in other words, late examination should
not matter unless it leads to notice beyond a reasonable time after the
buyer "ought to have discovered" a lack of conformity. My approach (if
notice is timely then late examination doesn't matter) is the opposite of
the court's approach (timely notice doesn't matter if examination was
late). Given that only the time of notice - not the time the buyer exam
ines the goods - has any impact on the party that Articles 38 and 39 were
designed to protect (the seller), I contend that my approach is the correct
one. If, on the contrary, you believe that there should be some sanction if
a buyer fails to examine the goods on time even if the seller receives
notice within the proper time period,91 why would you chose to impose
the "draconian" sanction specified in Article 39(1) for late notice - i.e.,
the loss of all rights with respect to lack of conformity? If the drafters
wanted that sanction for violations of Article 38, they certainly knew how
90 I should note that the court did not. in its opinion, adopt the noble month
approach (it had no occasion to do so) or state that buyer's June 17 notice would have
been timely if its examination had not been late -although the court certainly did
make it clear that the reason it found the buyer's notice was too late was because
examination had been too late. The argument in the text is based on the acceptance
that the noble month approach (or other approaches that would lead to finding tbat
notice given within a month was sufficient) has gained in Germany. See UNCITRAL
Digest of case law, supra note 47, art. 39 91 20 n. 114.
91 I am unsure how a system designed to "punish" a buyer for violating its Article
38 obligations (and thus to deter it from doing so) would work. Suppose the buyer is
late in examining goods but the lack of conformity is a latent one that the buyer
would not have discovered in a timely examination. Do you strip the buyer of its right
to complain about the latent defect. or does the buyer "get away with" the late
examination? Or suppose the goods that the buyer examined tardily are perfectly
conforming: how then do you "punish" the buyer for violating its examination
obligations?
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to say so - as they did in the very next section. Furthermore, the severe
sanction imposed for late notice in Article 39(1) was highly controversial
at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference at which the text of Convention was
finalized, and it even threatened to sink the whole project. 92 Why would
one chose to extend that sanction beyond what the text of the Conven
tion requires? Some other penalty - such as liability for extra expenses
the seller suffers as a consequence of the late examination, or even fining
the buyer some arbitrary amount - would make more sense than what the
court does (although none of this makes sense to me), and would have at
least as much (probably more) justification from the text of the CISG.
The result of the court's long series of misinterpretations and mistakes
was a truly stunning injustice. As the court itself held, the seller commit
ted a fundamental breach by delivering shoes so pitiably non-conforming
- so very, very far from the contract's requirement of "class one" or
"class two" used shoes - that the Ugandan Bureau of Standards blocked
their import and recommended that they be destroyed. This seller
escaped without liability, and was permitted to retain the full contract
price the buyer paid. The buyer, located in a developing (and urgently
poor) nation, lost everything - the contract price it paid, its right to shoes
that conformed to the contract, and even the wretched goods that the
seller actually sent, which (presumably) had to be destroyed as recom
mended by the Ugandan Standards Bureau (quite likely at the buyer's
expense). All this occurred merely because the buyer waited until the
goods arrived at the borders of its own country before examining them,
and it happened even though the buyer still managed to give the seller
notice of lack of conformity well within the time that would be deemed
acceptable by many (if not most) German courts. I find this result almost
unfathomable.
The result in the used shoes case is an extreme example of what strikes
me as a strange fixation by some courts on forcing buyers to follow a
rigidly-defined process for discovering and notifying the seller of a lack of
conformity. This fixation manifests itself by visiting upon buyers the dir
est consequences - a complete loss of any rights relating to the breach 
for the least failure to follow that process. 93 The result occurs regardless
of whether the seller (who, at least allegedly, caused the problems by
failing to meet one of its most basic contractual obligations) has suffered
any prejudice whatsoever from the buyer's "sin," and without sufficient
justification from the text of the Convention. Of COUrse achieving the
monstrous result in the used shoes case took a tour de force by the court
- although a decidedly perverse one! The fact that the buyer who suf
fered the result in the used shoes case was located in a developing coun
92 See Flechtner, Buyer's obligation, supra note 55. at 378 (recounting history of
Convention text).
93 See id. at 380 (describing the November 30. 1999 decision of the Landgericht
Koln).
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try sharpens the sense of injustice. A full appreciation of this aspect of
the case, however, must await the discussion below of the court's han
dling of Article 44. 94
Several provisions in Part III, Section II, Chapter II of the Convention
that have not yet been discussed also address the buyer's notice obliga
tions. Article 43(2) provides that a seller is not entitled to "rely on" a
buyer's failure to notify the seller of a third party's right or claim as
required by Article 43(1) if the seller "knew of the right or claim of the
third party and the nature of it." This generally parallels the rule in Arti
cle 40 which provides that a seller cannot "rely on" a buyer's failure to
properly examine goods under Article 38 or to give notice of a lack of
conformity as required by Article 39 if the seller "knew or could not have
been unaware" of the facts relating to the lack of conformity and the
seller failed to disclose those facts to the buyer. 95 The main difference
between Article 43(2) and Article 40 is that the former applies to Article
43(1) notice (i.e., a buyer's notice of third party claims that allegedly give
rise to a viola tion of the seller's 0 bliga tions under Articles 41 or 42 96 )
whereas the latter applies to Article 39 notice (i.e., a buyer's notice that
the seller violated its obligations under Article 35 97 ) - although there are
other differences going to the substance rather than the scope of the pro
visions. For example, Article 40 prevents a seller from invoking a buyer's
failure to satisfy Article 39 if the seller "knew or could not have been
unaware" of the lack of conformity at issue; Article 43(2), in contrast,
excuses non-compliance with Article 43(1) only if the seller actually knew
of the right or claim as to which the buyer failed to satisfy its notice obli
gations. Thus when the buyer in the automobile case discussed earlier
argued that Article 43(2) precluded the seller from invoking the buyer's
failure to give proper notice of the insurance company's claim to the car,
the OLG (as reported in the BGH opinion) dismissed the argument
because the buyer had failed to prove the seller had "positive knowledge"
of the claim "at the time when the claim would have had to have been
presented to him.,,98 The BGH let this analysis stand without comment.

94

See infra text accompanying nn. 103-104.

95 Because of the parallels between Article 40 and Article 43(2), decisions
construing the former can provide guidance in applying the latter. See UNCITRAL
Digest of case law, supra note 47, art. 43 'll 2 ("those called upon to interpret ...
article 43(2) may look for guidance from the numerous decisions that apply the
parallel provisions of article ... 40").
96 For discussion of Articles 41 and 42, see supra Part I1.B.
97 For discussion of Article 35, see supra Part II.A.
98 BGB. Jan. 11, 2006. supra note 43. On the question of the time as of which to
determine whether the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the defect. see
lngeborg Schwenzer. Article 40. ill COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION. supra
note 2. at 479-80.
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Article 44 of the Convention provides that a buyer who has a "reasona
ble excuse" for failing to provide notice as required by Article 39(1)99 or
Article 43(1) retains some (but not all) of the remedies it would have if it
had met its notice obligations. Specifically, a buyer who successfully
invokes Article 44 retains the right to reduce the price for goods as pro
vided in Article 50, as well as the right to claim damages (except damages
for lost profits). Even with an Article 44 "excuse" however, a party's
failure to give proper notice has serious consequences: it results in the
loss of (inter alia) the right to avoid the contract (see Article 49) or to
require the seller to repair or replace the goods (see Article 46(2) &
(3)).100 Article 44, which was added to the ClSG at the 1980 Diplomatic
Conference in Vienna at which the text of the Convention was approved,
was designed to ease concerns, primarily among developing countries,
with the "draconian" consequences the Convention visits upon buyers
who do not give proper notice. 101 In the automobile case previously dis
cussed, the buyer invoked Article 44 in an attempt to preserve some of its
remedies for the seller's alleged violation of Article 41. The BGH
commented:
[T]he buyer's conduct [in failing to give the required notice] is
excused [under Article 44] if, under the circumstances of the individ
ual case, he equitably deserves a certain understanding and a certain
consideration. This is the case when the violation of the rnotice]
obligation under Art. 43 CISG - especially with regard to the per
sonal circumstances of the buyer - has such slight repercussions that
a buyer is customarily forgiven for it and therefore does not justify
the substantial consequences of a complete exclusion of warranties.
Here, however, restraint is called for; a broad application of Art. 44
ClSG is prohibited in light of its character as an exception .... 102
Applying these principles, the BGH let stand the lower court's conclu
sion that the buyer had not proven a "reasonable excuse" for its failure to
meet the notice obligations of Article 43(1). That conclusion appears jus
tified on the facts of the automobile case: the buyer simply failed to prove
any "special facts" that caused its notice to be late. Of course, as stated
above the buyer's notice should not have been judged late in the first
place, so that the issue of an Article 44 excuse for late notice should not
have arisen. But given the court's premises, I have no complaints about
the way it applied Article 44 to the facts of the automobile case.
99 Note, however. that Article 44 does not apply to a buyer's failure to meet the
two-year notice deadline in Article 39(2).
100 Ulrich Huber & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 44, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 511.
101 For an account of the history of Article 44, see Flechtner, Buyer's obligation,
supra note 55. at 378.
102 BGH, Jan. 11,2006, supra note 43.
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The court in the used shoes case,103 however, managed to resist what
appears to have been a meritorious Article 44 claim. The buyer in that
case offered a compelling "reasonable excuse" for its late examination of
the goods (and hence for its "late" notice of lack of conformity under
Article 39): examining the goods at their original port of arrival
(Mombassa), as the court demanded, would have required the Ugandan
buyer to incur the extra expense of traveling to or arranging for an
inspection agent at that port and, most importantly, would have triggered
Kenyan customs duties. The buyer quite understandably desired to avoid
these expenses, which it did by waiting a short time to examine the goods
after they arrived in Uganda. The buyer's concerns are excellent exam
ples of what the developing States who demanded that Article 44 be
added to Convention wanted to have taken into account before their buy
ers would be stripped of all rights with respect to a lack of conformity.
The court in the used shoes case, however, was dismissive of the buyer's
Article 44 plea: "The Buyer also cannot reduce the price. The lack of a
timely notice of non-conformity has not been supported by an acceptable
excuse by the Buyer (Art. 44 CISG).,,104 The court shows no apprecia
tion for, or even cognizance of, the purpose behind Article 44 - to require
that the difficult circumstances faced by buyers in developing states be
taken into account before imposing the full panoply of the Convention'S
extreme sanctions for failure to comply with notice requirements. This is
a revealing measure of the court's unwillingness, even inability, to inter
pret the Convention from an international perspective, and its failure to
respect the need to promote good faith in international trade, as required
by Article 7(1).

IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has discussed several German decisions in the course of
describing the provisions in Part III, Chapter II, Section II of the Conven
tion. Until a cache of Chinese arbitration decisions applying the CISG
recently surfaced,105 German courts had contributed many more deci
sions to the jurisprudence of the CISG than any other jurisdiction. My
discussion has included criticism of those decisions. In the case of the two
BGH decisions analyzed at length, that criticism is in the nature of point
ing out that no analysis is perfect (something always possible to an aca
demic) and indicating the direction where progress might lie. My
discussion of the BGH cases has also included praise, since those deci
sions (partiCUlarly the 1995 Mussels Case) make important contributions
to CISG analysis and stand as guideposts pointing to an international
approach to the Convention that other tribunals should emulate. I have
103 LG Apr. 11 2005, supra note 71.
Id.
See Pace Law School CISG Database, Country Case Schedule, htlp:/lwww.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/textlcasecil.html#china (last visited Mar. 23. 2008).
104

105
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been much harsher with the 2005 used shoes case. It is a decision that I
believe thoroughly deserves such harsh treatment - although it is impor
tant to note that it is the product of a trial court, so that any pernicious
influence it might exert will, I hope, be limited.
My discussion of decisions from the jurisdiction that has the best-devel
oped and most sophisticated CISG jurisprudence 106 also illustrates why
ratification of the Convention by Turkey,107 to be followed by contribu
tions to the understanding of the CISG from Turkish tribunals and com
mentators, would be an extremely positive development. What is needed
to achieve a truly international approach to the Convention, and thus
what would be instrumental to the development of a truly international
general commercial law, is inclusion of viewpoints that represent the true
range of global diversity. Turkey is in a unique position to act as a bridge
between the current CISG jurisprudence, which has developed largely
(although by no means exclusively) in tribunals of Western Europe, and
hitherto un- or under-represented view points. To the extent my small
voice might help, I urge Turkey to join the sixty-seven diverse States that
have already ratified the Convention - a group that includes the lion's
share of European Union States. It is a move that will benefit the com
merce of Turkey, and for all Contracting States will be an aid to achieving
a genuinely uniform global law of sales.
106 Particular Italian decisions, however, eclipse anything that has yet appeared in
Germany or anywhere else. See Trib. di Vigevano, 12 July 2000, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html; Trib. di Rimini, 26 Nov. 2002, available at
http://cisgw3.Jaw.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html; Trib. di Padova, 25 Feb. 2004,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html; Trib. di Padova, 31 Mar.
2004, available at http://cisgw3.Jaw.pace.edu/cases/040331i3.html.
107 As was noted supra note *, the original of this paper was occasioned by a
conference at Istanbul Bilgi University, which was held in anticipation of Turkey'S
ratification of the CISG.

